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Note
That’s My Baby: Why the State’s Interest in
Promoting Public Health Does Not Justify
Residual Newborn Blood Spot Research Without
Parental Consent
Allison M. Whelan∗
On November 4, 2008, Andrea Beleno gave birth to her
1
son, Joaquin, in Austin, Texas. Like 98% of babies born in the
2
United States, his heel was pricked and five drops of blood
were collected and submitted to the Texas Department of State
Health Services (TDSHS) as part of its mandatory newborn
3
screening program. However, “in the haze after giving birth,”
4
Beleno neither knew about nor consented to the screening. Pa5
rental consent is not required for the initial screening, which
∗ J.D. and M.A. Bioethics Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota;
B.A. and B.S. 2011, Binghamton University. Thank you to Professor Michele
Goodwin for her invaluable and insightful assistance throughout this entire
process; this Note would not have been possible without her. Thank you to the
phenomenal board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for all their support
and hard work. I would also like to thank my friends, and most importantly,
my family: Kaitlin and Molly, the best sisters a girl could ask for, and my parents, Karen and Dan, for their unending love, support, and belief that I can do
whatever I put my mind to. I owe you both the world. Copyright © 2013 by Allison M. Whelan.
1. Mary Ann Roser, State Agrees to Destroy More than 5 Million Stored
Blood Samples from Newborns, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 22, 2009, http://
www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional/state-agrees-to-destroy-more
-than-5-million-stored/nRZK9/ [hereinafter Roser, State Agrees to Destroy].
2. VANI KILAKKATHI, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, NEWBORN
SCREENING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 4 (2012), available at http://
www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/WNMAKEPP1P.pdf.
3. Government Taking Newborn DNA Samples, KXAN (Nov. 24, 2009,
3:00
PM),
http://www.kxan.com/news/government-taking-newborn-dna
-samples-; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33.011(a) (2010) (requiring physician to draw newborn’s blood to test for various genetic conditions specified by the Department of Health).
4. Roser, State Agrees to Destroy, supra note 1.
5. For a discussion of how newborn screening developed into a state-run
program without an informed consent requirement, see Lainie Friedman Ross,
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tests for a variety of conditions that can be effectively treated
6
through early detection. Beleno sued TDSHS when she
7
learned the state was storing newborn blood samples (NBS)
8
“indefinitely” for research unrelated to the initial screening.
9
Beleno did not object to the initial screening. What she
found problematic was the potentially “indefinite” retention of
her son’s genetic material and the unknown and undisclosed
10
uses of the NBS. Two other recent lawsuits and a series of in11
terviews demonstrate she is not alone in her concerns. Beleno
worried about the misuse of her son’s genetic information, such
12
as in future employment or insurance discrimination.
Beleno’s experience is not unusual given that all fifty
13
states operate newborn screening programs. Proponents of the
programs argue they are an important public health tool because they facilitate early detection of certain genetic diseas14
es. For example, the major consequence of Phenylketonuria

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Consent for Newborn Screening?, 20 KENNEDY
INST. ETHICS J. 299, 300–02 (2010).
6. See, e.g., KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 10 (relating the “numerous
personal stories from parents whose children are able to lead normal, healthy
lives because of early screening and treatment of various genetic conditions”).
7. Throughout this Note “NBS” will be used to refer to the synonymous
terms “newborn blood samples” and “newborn blood spots.”
8. First Amended Complaint ¶ 12, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health
Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB (W.D. Tex. dismissed Dec. 14, 2009), 2009 WL
5072239 [hereinafter Beleno Complaint].
9. Id. ¶ 15.
10. Id. ¶ 15–16.
11. See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (holding
that the state statute regulating newborn blood tests does not authorize residual use and dissemination of NBS); Complaint ¶ 8, Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of
State Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 510-cv-00990)
[hereinafter Higgins Complaint] (claiming the State “knowingly, deceptively
. . . and without the knowledge or consent of the infants’ parents, sold . . . and
distributed [NBS] . . . to . . . third parties”); Erin Rothwell et al., Assessing
Public Attitudes on the Retention and Use of Residual Newborn Screening
Blood Samples: A Focus Group Study, 74 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1305, 1307 (2012)
(compiling parents’ opinions about residual NBS retention and use).
12. Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 16.
13. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 29–37 for a chart with each state’s
newborn screening program policies.
14. See, e.g., Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1305 (noting that “NBS is a
core service for public health” and that testing “identif[ies] infants at high risk
for particular conditions and would benefit from early treatment”); Michael S.
Watson et al., Newborn Screening: Toward a Uniform Screening Panel and
System, 8 GENETICS IN MED., May 2006, at 12S, 15S, available at https://www
.acmg.net/resources/policies/NBS/NBS_Main_Report_00.pdf
(“[N]ewborn
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(severe mental retardation) can be prevented through early de15
tection and implementation of a low phenylalanine diet. But
Beleno, and others, primarily take issue with the unclear and
undisclosed state policies regulating storage and use of NBS
that remain after the initial screenings and follow-up tests are
16
completed. Parents and patient advocacy groups raise additional concerns, including: (1) the lack of informed consent required for residual NBS use in research; (2) privacy concerns;
and (3) whether states have legitimate justifications to store
17
and use residual NBS without parental consent.
The focus of this Note is on the state’s role in residual NBS
storage and use and whether its interest in promoting public
health is compelling enough to overcome well-recognized parental rights to consent to their children’s medical treatment and
18
research participation. The analysis draws on precedent discussing the scope of the state’s right to infringe on individual
liberties in the interest of public health. In this context, this
Note evaluates whether those cases in which the state’s interest has prevailed are sufficiently analogous to apply to the
state’s use of residual NBS without parental consent.
This Note argues that the government’s interest in and obligation to promote public health do not justify non-consensual
use of NBS. Part I provides an overview of police power jurisprudence, existing state policies regulating residual NBS storage and use, and previous litigation disputing state policies and
practices. Part II discusses the possible public health justifications for using residual NBS without parental consent and
screening is a highly visible and important State-based public health program
. . . .”).
15. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 5.
16. See Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 12–18; see also KILAKKATHI,
supra note 2, at 4 (“[T]here is also little transparency regarding storage procedures or the use of the samples after they have been screened.”) (emphasis
added); Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1305 (noting that research projects
conducted after the initial screening and without parental consent “raise[]
several ethical and legal dilemmas”).
17. For a discussion of the issues raised by screening, storage, and use of
residual NBS, see KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 12–23.
18. See, e.g., COMM. ON CLINICAL RES. INVOLVING CHILDREN, THE ETHICAL CONDUCT OF CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 146 (Marilyn J.
Field & Richard E. Behrman eds., 2004) (discussing parents’ legal authority to
consent to their child’s participation in research); Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 317 (1995) (“[I]n most cases, physicians have an ethical (and legal) obligation to obtain parental permission to undertake[] recommended
medical interventions.”).
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whether this is an appropriate and permissible mechanism to
fulfill the government’s obligation to promote public health.
Part III concludes that the state’s interest in promoting public
health, although important, does not justify a blanket waiver of
parental consent. Part III then proposes a policy that states
can, and should, implement to increase transparency and ensure that parental rights and children’s rights are respected
while still promoting public health through medical research
that aims to detect new conditions, develop new treatments,
and eradicate disease.
I. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND
NBS LAWS AND RECENT LITIGATION
Part I proceeds in three parts. Part A addresses the tensions emerging from jurisprudence discussing state police powers, providing a descriptive account of the limitations on state
police power. Part B briefly describes current state laws governing residual NBS retention and use. Part C then discusses
recent litigation disputing residual NBS use in Minnesota and
Texas.
A. PRECEDENT RECOGNIZING THE STATE’S INTEREST IN
PROTECTING AND PROMOTING PUBLIC HEALTH
According to the Institute of Medicine, public health is
“what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions
for people to be healthy,” a definition which “reinforces that collective entities (governments and communities) are responsible
19
for healthy populations.” Because public health research and
regulations aim to benefit the community as a whole, tensions
ultimately arise between collective benefits and individual
20
rights and interests.
Notwithstanding these tensions, government intervention
to promote public health has long been valued and viewed as an
21
“unmitigated good.” The government frequently capitalizes on
19. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 143 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www
.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing_Book/public%
20health%20chapter.pdf.
20. Id. (noting that public health regulations and interventions often “encroach on fundamental civil liberties such as privacy [and] bodily integrity”).
21. Lawrence O. Gostin, General Justifications for Public Health Regulation, 121 PUB. HEALTH 829, 829 (2007).
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this conventional belief to justify public health interventions
22
that restrict individual liberties. Furthermore, courts have
repeatedly affirmed the state’s legitimate interest in protecting
23
public health and safety. This authority to protect public
health and welfare falls within a state’s “police power,” a power
which “extends . . . to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
24
comfort, and quiet of all persons.”
Although Supreme Court rulings hold there is “no question” that states have the “perfect right” to exercise their police
25
powers when necessary, statutes and case law illustrate that
26
such rights are tempered. Throughout history and across a
broad set of law and public health controversies, such as quarantine, mandatory vaccinations, prescription drug reporting
requirements, and public smoking bans, courts have affirmed
states’ use of police powers to protect public health while simul27
taneously acknowledging the powers’ limits.

22. Examples include infectious disease controls such as quarantines and
mandatory vaccinations, public smoking restrictions, and restricting access to
unhealthy foods to reduce obesity. See id. at 830–32.
23. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872)
(“[P]ersons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.”); see
also NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 492
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the “well-recognized and far-reaching police power of
the state over the health and welfare of its citizens”).
24. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. For example, many state quarantine laws require a state to have
“clear and convincing evidence” that the infringements will achieve its goals
and do so by using the “least restrictive means” possible to achieve these goals.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325–
8(g) (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-9-1.5 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 144.419 (West 2011).
27. The following cases, while not an exhaustive list, illustrate this jurisprudence.
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1. Quarantine: Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur
28
v. Louisiana State Board of Health
In 1898, the plaintiff, a French corporation, sent a ship to
29
New Orleans with cargo and over 400 passengers. Although
there was no evidence of infected passengers, the ship was not
allowed to unload her cargo or passengers upon arrival in New
30
Orleans. This was due to a recently adopted regulation giving
the state board of health the authority to “prohibit the introduction into any infected portion of the State, persons acclimated, unacclimated, or said to be immune, when in its judgment
the introduction of such persons would add to or increase the
31
prevalence of the disease.” The regulation’s goal was to reduce
the number of infected individuals and prevent the spread of
32
disease. When the ship landed, New Orleans was under quarantine and thus the passengers were not allowed to disembark
33
the ship.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice White referred to a
state’s historically recognized power to enact and enforce quar34
antine laws to protect its citizens’ health and safety. He concluded that laws intending to prevent, eradicate, or control the
spread of communicable diseases do not violate the Constitu35
tion. Importantly, however, Justice White noted that if a state
uses its police power in a way that is “repugnant” to the Consti36
tution, the Constitution “must prevail.”
2. Compulsory Vaccination: Jacobson v. Massachusetts

37

In 1902, Cambridge, Massachusetts’s board of health
adopted a regulation requiring all city inhabitants to be vaccinated or revaccinated for smallpox because of the disease’s in28. 186 U.S. 380 (1902). Most states also have public health laws specific
to quarantine procedures. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136; IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-41-9-1.5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419; see also State Quarantine and
Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEG., http://www.ncsl.org/issues
-research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx (last updated
Aug. 2010) (listing state quarantine and isolation laws).
29. Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 381–82.
30. Id. at 382.
31. Id. at 385.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 382.
34. Id. at 387.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 387–88.
37. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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38

creased prevalence in the city. The regulation was enacted
under a state law giving the board of health the authority to
require and enforce vaccination or revaccination when “neces39
sary for the public health or safety.”
The State filed criminal charges against Jacobson after he
40
refused to comply with the vaccination requirement. Jacobson
alleged that the Massachusetts law violated his Fourteenth
41
Amendment rights. He was found guilty and the case eventually reached the Supreme Court. The main issue the Court addressed was whether a statute requiring a person to submit to
42
vaccination was unconstitutional. The Court upheld the mandate, concluding that based on the “principle of self-defense . . .
a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic
of disease which threatens the safety of its members” and that
the statute was a “reasonable and proper exercise of the
43
[state’s] police power.”
44
Similar to Justice White in Compagnie Francaise, Justice
Harlan, delivering the opinion of the Court, made clear that police powers are limited and acknowledged that individuals have
the right to dispute governmental interference with the exer45
cise of their freedom. If police powers are used inappropriately, arbitrarily, or oppressively, the courts may justifiably inter46
vene “to prevent wrong and oppression.”
3. Reporting Schedule II Drug Prescriptions: Whalen v. Roe

47

Police powers are also invoked in contexts beyond infectious disease prevention. In 1972, the New York State Legislature enacted a law requiring physicians to provide the state
48
with information about all Schedule II drug prescriptions. Its
purpose was to prevent potentially dangerous drugs from enter38. Id. at 12.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 13.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 27, 35.
44. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 388 (1902).
45. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
46. Id.
47. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
48. Id. at 591–93. Schedule II drugs are those considered “the most dangerous of the legitimate drugs,” such as opium, methadone, amphetamines,
and methaqualone. Id. at 593 & n.8.
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49

ing illegal markets. The required information included the
prescribing physician’s name, the dispensing pharmacy, the
50
drug and dosage, and the patient’s name, address, and age.
The information was then stored in a secure computer system
51
managed by the State Department of Health. Under the statute, it was a crime to publicly disclose information in these rec52
ords. Physicians and patients claimed the law violated their
right to privacy, intruded upon the doctor-patient relationship,
53
and was “needlessly broad.”
The Court upheld the statute, concluding it was a reasona54
ble exercise of the state’s police power. In his concurrence,
Justice Brennan, like his predecessors, noted the power’s limits
and reserved the Court’s right to intervene in the future: “The
central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data
vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and
I am not prepared to say that future developments will not
55
demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.”
4. Public Smoking Bans
Two final examples involve public smoking bans. In 2003,
New York amended the Clean Indoor Air Act to prohibit indoor
56
smoking where people socialize or work. The law was passed
in response to increasing scientific and medical evidence establishing a correlation between “environmental tobacco smoke”
(ETS) (second-hand smoke) and severe health risks to non57
58
smokers. NYC C.L.A.S.H., a smokers’ rights lobbying group,
filed a lawsuit claiming various constitutional violations, with
59
particular focus on the First Amendment.

49. Id. at 591.
50. Id. at 593.
51. Id. at 593–94.
52. Id. at 594–95.
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id. at 597–98.
55. Id. at 607.
56. NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
57. Id.
58. NYC C.L.A.S.H. stands for “Citizens Lobbying Against Smoker Harassment.” Its goal is to “end the discrimination against smokers by exposing
the anti-smoking lies.” NYC C.L.A.S.H., http://www.nycclash.com (last visited
Oct. 17, 2013).
59. NYC C.L.A.S.H., 315 F.Supp. 2d at 467–68.
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In its analysis, the court emphasized the significant and
60
widely recognized evidence of ETS’s harms. The court applied
a rational basis test under which there need only be “some ‘reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
61
basis’” to uphold a statute. Relying heavily on the evidence of
ETS’s harms, the court concluded that the smoking ban’s intended goal—to protect the public “from the well-documented
harmful effects of ETS”—provided a sufficient rational basis to
62
uphold the ban.
Ohio voters passed a similar law in 2006, the “Smoke Free
Workplace Act,” which prohibits smoking in “public places of
63
employment.” A bar owned by Bartec Inc. failed to comply
with the Act and was cited for numerous violations, prompting
the Ohio Department of Health to file a complaint seeking in64
junctive relief to order compliance with the Act. Bartec counterclaimed, alleging in part that the Act “exceed[ed] the limits
65
of the state’s police powers.”
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed with Bartec, recognizing that property rights granted by the Ohio Constitution were
not absolute and could be subjected “to a reasonable,
nonarbitrary exercise of the police power . . . when exercised in
66
the interest of public health, safety, morals, or welfare.” According to the court, a law is in the interest of public health and
welfare if it is “reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . confer[s] upon
67
the public a benefit commensurate with its burdens . . . .” The
court upheld the Act, concluding it was a proper use of the
state’s police power and was “neither unduly oppressive nor ar68
bitrary in its restrictions.”
Although far from exhaustive, these cases illustrate that
across a broad set of law and public health controversies, courts
recognize and affirm use of police powers to protect public
health but also acknowledge the power must be limited to protect individual freedom. Because of the potential public health
60. Id. at 497.
61. Id. at 486 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
62. Id. at 492.
63. Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 902 (Ohio 2012).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 912. Bartec also filed a cross-claim against the Ohio Attorney
General. Id. at 902.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 913 (quoting Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 38 N.E.2d
70, 73 (1941)).
68. Id. at 914.
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benefits of residual NBS research and the corresponding risks
to and infringement upon personal privacy, residual NBS use
without informed parental consent raises the question of
whether the state’s police power can be invoked in this context.
B. RESIDUAL NBS RETENTION AND USE: STATE LAWS
69

Newborn blood screenings are performed in all fifty states
and test for a variety of conditions that are life-threatening if
70
not diagnosed and treated shortly after birth. However, the
state policies and regulations governing the specific tests performed and the retention and use of residual NBS are not uni71
form, and parental consent is often not required for the initial
72
screenings. And although a majority of parents are aware of
73
the initial screening, knowledge about residual retention and
74
use is more limited. Many parents are unaware that their
child’s blood may be kept and stored for a number of years, if
not indefinitely, during which time the NBS may be used in re75
search unrelated to the initial screening.
A survey of legislation governing consent procedures for
residual NBS storage and use indicates a wide and inconsistent
76
range of policies. Oklahoma, for example, stores the bloodspots for forty-two days and requires written parental consent
77
for continued storage and research use. On the other end of
the spectrum, North Dakota stores the samples indefinitely
with no specific consent required, allows the samples to be used
for “medical, psychological, or sociological research,” and per69. Michelle H. Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention and Use
of Residual Newborn Screening Blood Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703, 704
(2011). For an example of a state statute governing the initial screening requirement, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.125 (West 2011).
70. See Lewis et al., supra note 69, at 707.
71. See News Release, Johns Hopkins Univ. Genetics & Pub. Pol’y Ctr.,
Most States Unclear About Storage, Use of Baby Blood Samples, New Study
Finds (Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter News Release, Johns Hopkins], available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.release.php?action=detail&pressrelease_id=
143 (“State laws and policies governing the storage and use of [residual NBS]
. . . range from explicit to non-existent . . . .”).
72. See Lewis et al., supra note 69, at 704.
73. In one study, 55% of parents knew the screening had been performed.
Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Public Attitudes Regarding the Use of Residual Newborn Screening Specimens for Research, 129 PEDIATRICS 231, 233 (2012).
74. See id. at 233–37.
75. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 15.
76. See id. at 29–37.
77. Id. at 35.
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mits the state to “charge for access to specimens.” Even when
parents are told that research may be conducted using NBS,
the reasons given for the research are often broad (e.g., “re79
search with a significant health benefit” ) and provide little, if
any, specific information to parents. Newborn screening information is “confidential” in only twenty-six states, but “confidentiality” does not necessarily require removal of identifying DNA
80
information from the blood spots. The idea of confidentiality is
thus misleading because it is possible to trace NBS back to the
81
specific infants they were obtained from.
Unclear and inexplicit state laws governing residual NBS
storage and use have resulted in a lack of comprehensive and
transparent policies, leaving parents and health-care providers
82
ill-informed. As a result, residual NBS have been the center of
recent public debate and litigation.
C. RECENT NBS LITIGATION
Newborn screening practices bring to the fore legal and
ethical tensions between the state and its citizenry. Researchers, physicians, and public health officials contend
that residual NBS research promotes public health because it
may lead to advancements in disease diagnosis and treatment
that will benefit both the individual children from whom the
83
samples were obtained and society as a whole. The destruc84
tion of millions of NBS required by recent disputes is troubling to public health officials and researchers who consider it a
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Lewis, supra note 69, at 705.
Id. at 705–06.
Id.
News Release, Johns Hopkins, supra note 71.
Peggy Fikac, State to Destroy Newborns’ Blood Samples, HOUS.
CHRON., Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/State
-to-destroy-newborns-blood-samples-1599212.php; see also Bradford L.
Therrell et al., Committee Report: Considerations and Recommendations for
National Guidance Regarding the Retention and Use of Residual Dried Blood
Spot Specimens After Newborn Screening, 13 GENETICS MED. 621, 623 (2011)
(discussing studies showing that use of residual NBS to develop tests has “accelerated” discoveries and has had “direct public health benefits”).
84. See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (concluding that the Minnesota Department of Health could not store NBS beyond its
statutory authorization and remanding for determination of remedy); Higgins
v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–46 (W.D. Tex.
2011) (discussing the Beleno settlement, which required destruction of NBS);
Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB (W.D. Tex.
dismissed Dec. 14, 2009).
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loss of great magnitude: “a superb database has been lost. This
database could have continued to shed light on causes of congenital birth defects and potentially led to preventative
measures saving thousands of infants and their families the
85
distress these defects cause.” There is also concern that more
detailed and time-consuming informed consent procedures will
86
increase costs, making research prohibitively expensive.
On the other side are parents concerned about parental
rights, privacy, and protection of their child’s sensitive genetic
87
information. The lack of information provided to parents
about residual NBS use was a catalyst for recent litigation in
Texas and Minnesota.
1. Texas Lawsuits
In Beleno v. Texas Department of State Health Services,
Andrea Beleno, on behalf of the class of parents and their infant children, alleged that the Texas Department of State
Health Services (TDSHS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU)
Health Science Center “unlawfully and deceptively collected
blood samples from their children at [the] time of birth and
stored those samples indefinitely for undisclosed research pur88
poses, without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent . . . .” Beleno
filed the lawsuit after learning her son’s NBS were being stored
89
at TAMU for research. According to the complaint, the Defendants’ policies and practices violated both the law and the
standard protocol of obtaining informed consent prior to any
90
study involving human subjects. The parties settled and the
85. Fikac, supra note 83 (quoting the President of Texas A&M Health Science Center).
86. For example, geneticist David Segal estimates that such changes
could increase administrative costs for the University of California by up to
$594,000 annually. Helen Shen, California Considers DNA Privacy Law, NATURE, May 18, 2012, http://www.nature.com/news/california-considers-dna
-privacy-law-1.10677.
87. See Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 769; Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 544;
Beleno, No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB.
88. Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, at 1.
89. See id. ¶ 12; Texas to Destroy Unauthorized Blood Samples, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/
12/23/texas_to_destroy_unauthorized_blood_samples/?camp=pm.
90. Beleno Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 18. This section of the complaint
refers to the human research subjects protections promulgated in 45 C.F.R.
Part 46, of which subpart A is frequently referred to as the “Common Rule.”
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/
commonrule/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Common Rule].
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case was dismissed with prejudice; thus no court judgment was
91
rendered. As part of the settlement, TDSHS agreed to destroy
approximately 4.5–5 million samples taken and stored without
parental consent between 2002 (when TDSHS began retaining
92
NBS for research) and May 27, 2009.
Despite the settlement, the battle continued. In 2010, Jim
Harrington, lawyer for the Beleno plaintiffs, learned that between 2003 and 2007 approximately 800 NBS were sent to the
United States military to create a “national mitochondrial DNA
93
database.” The database was never mentioned during the
lawsuit, and Harrington claimed he was repeatedly assured
that the NBS were used only for medical research and not law
94
enforcement purposes. A new class action lawsuit was filed,
claiming that TDSHS “deceptively [and] unlawfully . . . sold,
traded, bartered, and distributed [NBS] . . . to private research
companies, government agencies, and other third parties,” in95
cluding the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. Although the
96
case was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing, it illustrates continuing questions and concerns about residual NBS
research.
2. Minnesota: Bearder v. State
98

97
99

In contrast to the settled or dismissed disputes in Texas,
the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a full opinion on a similar
91. See Order of Dismissal, with Prejudice, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09CA-188-FB (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009); Becca Aaronson, Lawsuit Alleges DSHS
Sold Baby DNA Samples, TEX. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.texastribune
.org/2010/12/08/lawsuit-alleges-dshs-sold-baby-dna-samples/.
92. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Newborn Blood Spot Banking: Approaches to
Consent, PREDICTER L. & POL’Y UPDATE, (Ind. Univ. Ctr. Bioethics, Indianapolis, Ind.), Mar. 12, 2010, at 10, available at http://bioethics.iu.edu/index.php/
download_file/view/91/.
93. Mary Ann Roser, Suit Possible over Baby DNA Sent to Military Lab
for National Database, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www
.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/suit-possible-over-baby
-dna-sent-to-military-lab-1/nRqkT/.
94. Id.
95. Higgins Complaint, supra note 11, ¶ 8; see also Aaronson, supra note
91 (discussing the state’s trade of NBS for lab supplies and services valued
around half a million dollars from a private company).
96. Higgins v. Texas Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553, 555
(W.D. Tex. 2011).
97. 806 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).
98. See Order of Dismissal, with Prejudice, Beleno v. Lakey, No. SA-09CA-188-FB (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009). Prior to dismissal, the parties settled.
See id.
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100

issue in Bearder v. State in 2011. What was unique about
Bearder was that the Plaintiffs brought a cause of action under
101
Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act (GPA), which “protects the
genetic privacy and DNA property rights of all Minnesotans,
102
including newborns.” The statute provides that an individual’s genetic information may only be collected with the individual’s written informed consent, used for the purposes specified
by the informed consent, used only for the length of time consented to, and cannot be disseminated to other parties without
103
additional written informed consent. According to the Plaintiffs, the state stored the NBS without parental consent and
104
shared the samples with private entities and hospitals.
Minnesota’s policy was to retain residual NBS unless there
105
was a specific request that the samples be destroyed. As of
December 31, 2008, more than 800,000 NBS were stored, dating back to 1997, and more than 50,000 NBS had been used in
studies for purposes unrelated to the initial newborn screen106
ings. The majority of NBS research uses “de-identified” sam107
ples, and under the current federal regulation known as the
108
“Common Rule,” studies involving de-identified health records and information are exempt from federal privacy protec-

99. See Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 553, 555. The case was dismissed for
lack of standing. Id.
100. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d.
101. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.386 (West 2011) (granting a statutory right to
privacy of genetic information).
102. First Amended Complaint at 34, Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766
(Minn. 2011) (No. 09-5615), 2009 WL 5427622 [hereinafter Bearder Complaint].
103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.386.
104. Bearder Complaint, supra note 102, at 4.
105. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 770.
106. Id. at 770–71.
107. Id. at 771. A de-identified sample is coded and separated from identifiers, but identifiers are kept and can be retrieved so that the sample can be
linked back to the individual. In contrast, anonymous samples lack identifiers
to link back to the donor. For an explanation of anonymous and de-identified
samples, see STEVE OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN USING RESIDUAL NEWBORN BLOOD SCREENING SAMPLES FOR
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 31–32 (2010), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12981&page=31; Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in Research?, AM.
J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 2010, at 3.
108. See Common Rule, supra note 90.
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tions and federal regulations governing human subject re109
search.
The Plaintiffs filed a number of claims, including violation
110
of the GPA. The State argued it did not violate the GPA because (1) blood samples are not “genetic information” under the
GPA; and (2) Minnesota’s “newborn screening statutes ‘expressly provide’ that the Department of Health may use, store, and
disseminate . . . genetic information without first obtaining
111
written informed consent.”
The district court granted the
112
113
State’s motion to dismiss and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that “genetic information” under the GPA “includes the actual blood
114
samples as ‘medical or biological’ information.”
Therefore
NBS are protected by the GPA, which requires “written informed consent to collect, use, store, or disseminate those sam115
ples.”
In response to the State’s claim that the newborn
screening statutes exempted it from the informed consent requirement, the court held that the statutes provide an exemption from the GPA requirements only for “testing the samples
for . . . disorders, recording and reporting those test results,
maintaining a registry of positive [results], and storing those

109. For instance, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012) states that “[r]esearch,
involving the collection or study of . . . specimens” is exempt from § 46 protections such as Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and informed consent
“if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.” The regulations comprising § 46 embody many of the ethical principles
and guidelines articulated in “The Belmont Report.” See Belmont Report: Ethical Principals and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18,
1979) [hereinafter The Belmont Report]. Similarly, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 excludes health information “that does not identify an individual and . . . there is
no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an
individual.” There are also exceptions to § 164.514, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) “Privacy Rule.” Rothstein, supra
note 107, at 4.
110. Bearder Complaint, supra note 102, at 5.
111. Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 771–72 (Minn. 2011).
112. Bearder v. State, No. 27-CV-09-5615, 2009 WL 5454446 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., Nov. 24, 2009), aff’d, 788 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806
N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).
113. Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d 806
N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2011).
114. Bearder, 806 N.W.2d at 774.
115. Id.
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116

results as required by federal law.” The exemptions do not
authorize the state to use, store, or disseminate the samples for
117
other purposes.
As a result of the court’s decision, the Minnesota Department of Health was ordered to destroy all NBS after they are
118
stored for seventy-one days. The destruction includes all NBS
collected on or after the Minnesota Supreme Court decision on
119
November 16, 2011.
Bearder represents the first, but likely not the last, court
decision limiting state use of residual NBS without informed
parental consent. Because of the potential public health benefits of residual NBS research, state policies should be scrutinized to determine whether the policies are justified under a
state’s police powers or whether changes must be made to include an informed consent procedure.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND RESIDUAL NBS RESEARCH
Supreme Court jurisprudence discussing a state’s interest
in public health indicates that states may act to prevent or reduce the risk of harm to the public even if such protection requires infringing on individual rights, autonomy, and priva120
cy.
The infringements involved in using NBS without
parental consent, however, cannot be justified by the reasoning
121
used in the previously discussed case law. Part A of this section discusses important differences between governmental use
of residual NBS for public health research and the state poli116. Id. at 776.
117. Id. at 1.
118. News Release, Minn. Dep’t of Health, Minnesota Department of
Health to Begin Destroying Newborn Blood Spots in Order to Comply with Recent Minnesota Supreme Court Ruling (Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter News Release, Minn. Dep’t of Health], available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/
news/pressrel/2012/newborn013112.html.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“There
are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good. . . . Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of the
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that
may be done to others.”). Justice Harlan noted that the Court had “more than
once recognized it as a fundamental principle that ‘persons and property are
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.’” Id. (quoting Hannibal & St. J.R.
Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877)).
121. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of precedent.
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cies at issue in precedent, arguing that there is a frequently ignored distinction between protection and promotion of public
health and that in both circumstances the risks and benefits
must be weighed. Part B then scrutinizes who actually benefits
from the research, given the tenuous connections between residual NBS research and public health benefits discussed in
Part A.
A. PROTECTING VERSUS PROMOTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH:
WEIGHING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS
The precedent cases address state laws and policies that
infringe on individual rights primarily to protect the public
122
from other individuals’ actions or behaviors such as smoking,
123
124
illegal drug sales, or spreading communicable diseases. In
such circumstances, statutes and case law recognize a state’s
right to police individual behavior to prevent harms to innocent
125
society members. As a society, we value individual freedom
but recognize its limits when such freedom endangers the wel126
fare of others.
Residual NBS research, however, is more
127
about public health promotion rather than protection—and
there is an important difference between the two. In either context, it is important to weigh the benefits of any policy requiring restrictions on individual rights.
1. Residual NBS Research: Protection or Promotion?
Quarantine laws, vaccination laws, and public smoking
128
bans provide clear, well-documented public protections. The
122. NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466
(S.D.N.Y 2004); Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 904–05 (Ohio 2012).
123. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591–93 (1977).
124. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 34–35 (construing Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E.
97 (N.Y. 1904)); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd.
of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 381 (1902).
125. See supra Part I.A.
126. According to John Stuart Mill, “The only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others.” JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (1859).
127. Public health promotion may occur, for example, by facilitating discovery of new diseases or treatments.
128. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Community Immunity
(“Herd Immunity”), VACCINES.GOV., http://www.vaccines.gov/basics/protection/
index.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Community Immunity]
(noting that when the majority of people are immunized, the rest of the community is usually protected because there is little opportunity for an outbreak).
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harms to be avoided can be clearly articulated—such as pre129
venting the spread of contagious diseases —and the methods
used by the states are usually taken only after consideration of
less-intrusive measures. Delaware’s isolation/quarantine law,
for example, is only used “during a state of emergency” and requires the State to use the “least restrictive means necessary” to
130
prevent disease transmission.
Similarly, during a public
health emergency, Virginia law authorizes the State Health
Commissioner to “requir[e] immediate immunization of all per131
sons.” Public smoking bans have been upheld and their justi132
fications buttressed by significant evidence of ETS’s harms,
and are further supported by evidence that such bans have suc133
cessfully reduced tobacco-related illnesses. Underlying these
court decisions is a recognition that the harms to be avoided
outweigh the possible harms caused by infringements on indi134
vidual rights.
In contrast, there is no similar clarity about health protec135
tions from residual use of NBS. Public health officials and researchers imply that harms could result if NBS are unavailable
for research. Officials in Minnesota, for example, argue that destroying the residual NBS data bank “will compromise [the
state’s] ability to assure the quality and accuracy of the newborn screening program,” suggesting that harms may occur
129. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 34; Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 381.
130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136(1)(c) (2005) (emphasis added). Many
other states have similar “least restrictive means necessary” requirements in
their quarantine statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-788 (2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.419 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:13-15 (West
2007).
131. The only exception is if a physician certifies, in writing, that the vaccine could be harmful to the particular individual. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48
(2011).
132. “[T]he evidence against ETS is consistent, profound, and widelyaccepted.” NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 497
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
133. In addition to reducing tobacco-related illnesses, there is evidence that
smoking bans may also reduce alcohol abuse. See Smoking Bans in Bars Help
Drinkers Drink Less Too, Yale Study Shows, YALE NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://news.yale.edu/2012/09/24/smoking-bans-bars-help-drinkers-drink-less
-too-yale-study-shows [hereinafter Smoking Bans in Bars].
134. In Jacobson, the Court agreed with “most of the members of the medical profession” that the risk of harm from a vaccination is “generally . . . too
small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits coming from . . . use of the
preventive . . . .” 197 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
135. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing the “mismatch” between promised and actual benefits of research using NBS).
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136

from inaccurate test results.
Yet even if the “harms” do occur, they are neither as clear
nor as compelling as those at issue in the case law. And perhaps more importantly, there are less intrusive methods available to ensure an adequate supply of residual NBS for research,
such as an opt-in informed consent procedure, which will be
137
discussed below.
In addition to the protection-based argument, states are also interested in promoting societal health and well-being by using NBS to conduct research that aims to discover new diseases
138
and develop new and improved therapies. Arguments based
on public health promotion rather than protection are even
more problematic and lack a firm grounding in either statutory
139
or case law previously discussed. Researchers and the public
health community tend to default to a public health promotion
rationale despite the speculative nature of these claims. However, the inherent uncertainty in medical research limits the
140
ability to promise or guarantee society-wide benefits. In an
era of impressive medical and scientific advancements and
141
grand promises for miracle vaccines, treatments, and cures, it
136. News Release, Minn. Dep’t of Health, supra note 118. Other reasons
to store and use residual NBS include: (1) improving the quality of screening
methods; (2) enabling “comparison and validation of new analytical methods”;
(3) use in public health research; and (4) use in research to “enhance general
medical knowledge.” OLSON & BERGER, supra note 107, at 10.
137. Even though these less-intrusive measures may be slightly more burdensome on the state, requiring parental consent “would arguably be less privacy invasive than conducting research without the parents’ knowledge.”
KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11; see also infra Part III.A (proposing an informed consent procedure for residual NBS use).
138. “[A] generally acknowledged component[] of a newborn screening system . . . includes . . . assessments of long-term benefits to individuals, families,
and society.” Watson et al., supra note 14, at 15S.
139. The relevant statutes and case law are largely written in terms of protections and harms. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005) (authorizing isolation and quarantine during a public health emergency); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (asserting that the state has a “vital interest in
controlling . . . dangerous drugs”) (emphasis added); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27
(concluding that communities have the right to protect themselves from disease based on “self-defense”).
140. See, e.g., KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (noting the “less grand benefits of screening” than those promised by the American College of Medical Genetics).
141. See, e.g., Nic Fleming, Cancer Cure ‘May Be Available in Two Years’,
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
1563521/Cancer-cure-may-be-available-in-two-years.html (discussing, in 2007,
scientists’ assertions that “[c]ancer sufferers could be cured with injections of
immune cells from other people within two years”).
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is important to be cautious of allowing such speculative promises to justify intrusions on personal freedoms. Newborn
142
screenings have been performed for over forty years and re143
sidual NBS have been used in a variety of studies, but there
have been few, if any, major “breakthroughs,” broadly felt public health benefits, or prevention of public health crises from
144
research results.
A primary rationale for residual NBS research is to ensure
the initial tests’ accuracy and to prevent false positives and
145
false negatives. However, quality assurance and accuracy research have not yielded such benefits. For example, one study
concluded that there has been little change in the tests’ “positive predictive values” (PPV), which measure the probability
that a patient with a positive test result actually has the indi146
cated disorder. Some states have a PPV of only 3%, meaning
that 97% of infants who initially test positive do not actually
147
have the disease. Quality assurance research is important,
but grand promises of medical breakthroughs should not be

142. Newborn screening programs began in the United States in the 1960s.
KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 5.
143. See, e.g., V.W. Burse et al., Preliminary Investigation of the Use of
Dried-Blood Spots for the Assessment of in Utero Exposure to Environmental
Pollutants, 61 BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR MED. 236, 238 (1997) (concluding
that NBS are a “valuable resource and cost-effective” source of information for
a variety of different studies, such as the impact of prenatal exposure to environmental toxins); Karin B. Nelson et al., Neuropeptides and Neurotrophins in
Neonatal Blood of Children with Autism or Mental Retardation, 49 ANNALS
NEUROLOGY 597, 597 (2001) (using NBS to examine biological causes/origins of
autism and mental retardation); Gary M. Shaw et al., Genetic Variation of Infant Reduced Folate Carrier (A80G) and Risk of Orofacial and Conotruncal
Heart Defects, 158 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 747, 747 (2003) (analyzing residual
NBS and finding “modest evidence for a gene-nutrient interaction” between a
gene implicated in cleft palate, heart defects, and maternal intake of folic acid).
144. In fact, “[w]hen asked about other applications of newborn screening,
[no] public health officials consulted . . . could offer examples of research projects that had yielded results aligned with the promises” made by the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, such as gaining a better understanding of diseases or developing a method for earlier interventions.
KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 9, 11.
145. See id. at 11 (discussing states’ performance of “quality assurance
studies”).
146. Id. at 10–11 (citing JoNel Aleccia, Babies’ Blood Tests Can End in
False-Positive Screening Scares, MSNBC (May 9, 2011, 8:33 AM), http://www
.today.com/id/42829175/ns/today-today_health/t/babiesblood-tests-can-end
-false-positive-screening-scares/#.UifzROZQFlr).
147. Id. at 11.
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148

used to justify a blanket waiver of informed parental consent.
The lack of significant findings or developments from residual NBS research raises serious questions about whether
the proposed benefits of such research outweigh the potential
risks and harms to individual rights and personal privacy. Because of the tenuous connections between protecting and promoting public health and NBS research, arguments attempting
to justify a blanket waiver of consent for residual NBS use
must fail.
2. Residual NBS Retention and Research: The Risks Are Real
In addition to the lack of significant benefits from residual
NBS research, there are also real and legitimate risks of harm,
particularly invasions to privacy. Risk-benefit ratios play an
important role in precedent cases recognizing legitimate re149
strictions on individual rights. It is therefore appropriate to
analyze whether the alleged public health benefits of residual
NBS research outweigh the potential risks. Residual NBS are
stored in “DNA databanks,” and parents are concerned about
150
potential genetic privacy violations that can impact both the
infant and his or her parents because certain genetic abnormal151
ities of a child indicate the same abnormality in the parents.
Fears of privacy breaches cannot be discounted or dismissed as
152
“paranoi[d]” or “irrational.” Security breaches can and do occur at biological databanks, such as a laptop theft from the
148. See, e.g., id. (“[W]hile formulating screening tests and ensuring that
existing tests meet certain quality standards are certainly beneficial applications of newborn screening, they seem to fall short of the stated promises of
elucidating disease characteristics and generating earlier interventions.”).
149. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd.
of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of New York, 315
F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898
(Ohio 2012).
150. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 16–17.
151. For example, if an infant has Huntington’s disease, this indicates that
at least one of his parents also has Huntington’s because it is an autosomal
dominant disorder. U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Huntington Disease, GENETICS
HOME REFERENCE (September 9, 2013), http://www.ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/
huntington-disease.
152. Attempts at discounting these fears have been made before. See
Taralyn Tan, Newborns’ DNA: Don’t Deny Scientists This Useful Resource,
GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECH. NEWS, http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/
newborns-dna-don-t-denyscientists-this-useful-resource/4377/ (last visited Oct.
17, 2013). Others note though that “privacy breaches [are] not just a hypothetical problem.” KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 16.
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Cord Blood Registry, the largest stem cell bank in the world.
Some argue that these privacy concerns are unfounded because the samples can be de-identified before research use and
thus do not require the additional protections typically afforded
154
to human subjects research under the Common Rule. These
arguments, however, are unsatisfactory because although deidentified samples are not directly identifiable, they are not
completely “anonymous,” and research shows that de-identified
155
samples can be linked back to the individual. Despite assurances that genetic data is de-identified and confidential,
“[s]cientists have been aware for years of the possibility that
coded or ‘anonymized’ sequenced DNA may be more readily
156
linked to an individual as genetic databases proliferate.” In
one study, researchers were able to “accurately and robustly
determine” whether a specific individual’s DNA was present in
157
a “complex genomic DNA mixture.”
Given the misunderstood definitions of de-identification,
arguments that the de-identification process eliminates the potential for privacy breaches and dissemination of personal bio158
logical and genetic information do not pass scientific muster.
153. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 16.
154. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment Based on
Mootness at 6, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs., No. SA-09-CA0188-FB (W.D. Tex. dismissed Dec. 14, 2009), 2009 WL 5072237 (stating that
under TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33.018, de-identified information “may
be released without consent” when it is being disclosed for a number of purposes, including research approved by the Institutional Review Board); see also sources cited supra note 107.
155. Rothstein, supra note 107, at 3, 5–6. “Identifiability exists on a continuum” and is affected by the particular de-identification technique used. Id.
156. Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312
SCI. 370, 370 (2006) (emphasis added).
157. Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts
of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, PLOS GENETICS, Aug. 29, 2008, at 1, 1, available at http://www
.plosgenetics.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%
2Fjournal.pgen.1000167&representation=PDF; see also Melissa Gymrek et al.,
Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 321, 323–24
(2013) (reporting results of a study in which researchers were able to determine the identities of fifty study participants from genetic information that
had supposedly been de-identified).
158. See Rothstein, supra note 107, at 3. Researchers have been able to
take “seemingly anonymous DNA database entries . . . and specifically identify
the persons who are the subjects of the information even though the DNA information” had been de-identified. Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, ReIdentification of DNA Through an Automated Linkage Process, PROC. J. AM.
MED. INFO. ASS’N SYMP. 423, 423 (2001). Even if complete and irreversible deidentification were possible, non-consensual use of an individual’s genetic in-
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The ambiguity of the term “de-identification” was noted by the
Plaintiffs in Bearder, who stated that “it is not so clear what
[the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH)] means when
they say that the blood samples and test data are ‘de159
identified.’” In response to the Plaintiffs’ request for documents detailing MDH’s de-identification procedure, the Defendants replied that “[n]o documents exist showing MDH processes of de-identification and reidentification,” indicating that
there is no established de-identification procedure and that the
process and standards “vary from project to project and are
160
subject to subjective standards.” Given that it is possible to
re-identify de-identified samples, the Common Rule protec161
tions—including informed consent —should apply to residual
NBS because the Rule only exempts information that “cannot
be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the sub162
jects.”
It is important to recognize that the potential privacy
harms are both tangible and intangible. Many are primarily
concerned about employment and/or insurance discrimination,
but for others the mere fact that one’s privacy has been violated
is viewed as “an intrinsic harm separate from discrimina163
tion.” Given the uncertain benefits and the real and legitimate risks of harm, informed consent and transparency are
even more important because of the inherent value many place
on their right to privacy and their desire to control what hap164
pens to their infant’s residual NBS. Indeed, many parents
would consent to residual use of their infant’s NBS; they simply

formation is still questionable and raises issues regarding the inherent harms
of disregarding autonomy, individual rights, and privacy rights. Analysis of
the issue if complete de-identification were possible, however, is beyond the
scope of this particular paper.
159. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law at 33, Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d
766 (Minn. 2011) (No. 27-CV-09-5615), 2009 WL 5427609.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. “[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research
covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective
informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2012).
162. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2012).
163. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 17–18.
164. “It’s respect. It should be an opt-in. I give my permission to do this.”
Rothwell et al., supra note 11, at 1307 (quoting focus group participants’
thoughts on research with residual NBS).
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As one parent succinctly

B. RISK-BENEFIT RATIOS: WHO REALLY BENEFITS?
If residual NBS research is beneficial, it must be determined who will actually benefit and whether the benefits and
167
burdens are fairly distributed. Scientific research using biological and genetic information from any source can benefit so168
ciety as a whole, but speculative promises are inadequate to
169
justify nonconsensual use of a person’s genetic material. If
new diseases are discovered or new treatments developed
through NBS research there is no guarantee that the majority
of the public will benefit. The unclear distribution of benefits
contrasts to the actual, broadly felt public health benefits of
170
171
policies such as smoking bans and mandatory vaccinations,
which can—and do—benefit the greater public. It is likely that
residual NBS research is, at least in part, facilitated by private
172
financial interest.
We no longer live in the era of Jonas Salk, who, when
asked who owned the patent to his newly developed polio vaccine, responded, “Well, the people, I would say. There is no pa-

165. “What’s important is just giving people a choice. I don’t like not having
a choice and that’s what bothers me.” Id.
166. Id.
167. The Belmont Report obligates the just allocation of benefits and burdens in human subject research. The Belmont Report, supra note 109.
168. See, e.g., REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS
2 (2010) (discussing the use of Lacks’ cells to facilitate “some of the most important advances in medicine: the polio vaccine, chemotherapy, cloning, gene
mapping, in vitro fertilization”).
169. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting that “the ‘public
health benefits’ cited by . . . public health officials and patients’ groups may
not live up to their promise”).
170. Smoking Bans in Bars, supra note 133 (“Bans on smoking in bars and
restaurants . . . reduce tobacco-related illnesses . . . .”).
171. See, e.g., Community Immunity, supra note 128 (explaining the concept of herd immunity).
172. “Part of the issue is that some parents are concerned that the state or
private companies could profit from the use of their children’s blood samples.”
News Release, Johns Hopkins, supra note 71 (quoting Michelle Lewis) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aaronson, supra note 91 (quoting attorney Jim Harrington, who, in response to the possibility that the Texas Department of State Health Services sold and/or traded NBS to commercial
entities, stated that “[i]t’s one thing to opt in to a research program that’s nonprofit; it’s another thing to have your DNA or your kid’s DNA used by a company to make millions of millions of dollars”).
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tent. Could you patent the sun?” Salk’s response suggests
that benefitting “the public as a whole” must at times take
174
precedence over innovators’ rights. But times have changed,
and today a major driver of innovation—particularly in medi175
cine—is profit potential,
and both states and researchers
176
profit from residual NBS research. Profitability and promoting health and well-being do not necessarily go hand-in-hand.
When courts have recognized justifiable restrictions on individual rights for public health purposes, the primary reasons for
the restrictions have been to protect the public from immi177
178
nent or well-evidenced long-term harms. Unlike NBS research, neither the state nor private entities had secondary,
179
profit-driven motives in precedent case law.
The potential for profit incentives to play a role in NBS research raises questions about whether the promised benefits
(new discoveries, treatments, etc.) will be available to “the public.” Providing broad public access to screenings and treatments
to promote public health is generally not a highly profitable en180
terprise, and despite a history of non-profit provision of care,
173. Krysta Kauble, Comment, Patenting Everything Under the Sun: Invoking the First Amendment to Limit the Use of Gene Patents, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1123, 1125 (2011).
174. Id.
175. See id. at 1131–32 (discussing the practice of granting patents on
“product[s] of nature,” and the increasing “financial interest in gene patents”).
Moore v. Regents of the University of California is another example of issues
arising from profit-driven medical research. The case involved a doctor using a
patient’s tissues without consent for research resulting in a patent that had a
predicted profit potential of $3 billion. 51 Cal. 3d 120, 174 (Cal. 1990).
176. See Aaronson, supra note 91 (discussing the Texas Department of
State Health Services’ trade of NBS for expensive lab supplies).
177. A highly contagious disease would be considered an imminent harm.
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905); Compagnie Francaise
de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 381 (1902).
178. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1977) (upholding a law
meant to prevent misuse of dangerous drugs); NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. City of
New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (noting “mounting scientific evidence” linking ETS “to serious health risks to non-smokers”); Wymsylo
v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898, 904–05 (Ohio 2012), reconsideration denied,
971 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 2012) (“[S]tudies have conclusively shown that exposure
to secondhand smoke . . . causes illness and disease . . . .”).
179. On the contrary, many business owners feared smoking bans would
decrease their profits. See Wymsylo, 970 N.E.2d at 915 (rejecting appellants’
claim regarding a decline in gross sales).
180. For example, pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to produce the flu-shot or other low-cost and therefore lower-profit vaccines, preferring to invest in high-cost drug development. The highest grossing vaccine has
yearly sales of about $1 billion, whereas a drug for diabetes can have annual
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our health care system has become increasingly commercial181
ized. States and researchers assure the public that NBS research will result in beneficial medical advancements, but they
do not further promise that these benefits will actually be
available to society as a whole. For example, if an effective
treatment was developed for a particular disease using NBS,
would states subsidize this treatment to make it affordable, or
would it be prohibitively expensive, preventing many from
reaping the benefits of NBS research? It seems unlikely states
will—or even can—make such promises. Thus it may be naïve
to assume NBS research will provide the broad “public” benefits that have been promised, given today’s profit-driven cli182
mate. And although a public health benefit need not be universally experienced by every individual, the ability to benefit
183
should not be dependent on ability to pay.
Justifying privacy infringements as serious as those involving an individual’s genetic information based on a public health
promotion argument could justify far too many other infringements and make it difficult to draw lines in the future. For example, if states can justify NBS use for public health-promoting
sales of more than $7 billion. Tim Krohn, Sick Days, Manufacturing Vaccine
Equal Bad Business, FREE PRESS, Jan. 9, 2013, http://mankatofreepress.com/
local/x964869559/Krohn-Sick-days-manufacturing-vaccine-equal-bad-business.
181. For a discussion of a non-profit versus for-profit health care system,
see Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, A Healthy Bottom Line: Profits or People?, 1 ISSUES IN ETHICS, no. 4, Summer 1988, available at http://www.scu.edu/
ethics/publications/iie/v1n4/healthy.html; see also Paul A. Offit, Why Are
Pharmaceutical Companies Gradually Abandoning Vaccines?, 24 HEALTH AFFAIRS 622, 622 (2005) (noting that pharmaceutical companies are driven by
profits because they are “businesses, not public health agencies”).
182. It could be argued that curing a previously incurable disease, no matter how small the affected population, justifies nonconsensual NBS research.
However, it would be inappropriate to use the state’s police powers to justify
such intrusion on individual rights and autonomy. Although we may wish that
the state would do so, it has no obligation to eradicate all potential or existing
diseases. In a public health context, police powers are invoked when necessary
to protect the broader public, which by definition requires a benefit to more
than just a small number of individuals. Indeed, “a principal aim of public
health is to achieve the greatest health benefits for the greatest number of
people.” PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 14 (Lawrence O. Gostin
ed., 2d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
183. The very nature of a public health system is to ensure that persons in
need are not denied care based on ability to pay. See, e.g., The Ethics of Health
Care Reform: Issues in Emergency-Medicine—An Information Paper, AM.
COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, http://www.acep.org/Content.aspx?id=80871
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (stating that public health insurance programs exist, in part, because “[w]e are unwilling to deny health care to other persons in
need”).
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research, perhaps they could also justify mandatory organ procurement from all deceased citizens—with or without consent.
There is much stronger evidence of the benefits from organ donation than from residual NBS research; organ donations can—
184
and do—save lives, which contrasts with the mere assumptions that NBS research will lead to beneficial discoveries and
185
developments. Using similar justifications, states could attempt to mandate all types of research participation, such as
clinical trials for new drugs that could, if approved, benefit the
186
public health.
The value American society places on autonomy, personal
privacy, and the right to control one’s own body requires the
conclusion that the potential benefits of residual NBS research
187
188
do not outweigh its possible tangible and intangible harms.
The state’s interest in promoting public health is neither an
adequate nor compelling enough justification to allow a blanket
waiver of informed parental consent. This conclusion does not,
however, require states to end residual NBS use altogether. Instead, states must develop and implement informed consent
policies and increase the transparency of their residual NBS
policies. Part III proposes possible mechanisms for implementing and improving an informed consent process.

184. Over 28,000 organ transplants were performed in 2012. Organ Donation, DONATE LIFE AM., http://donatelife.net/understanding-donation/organ
-donation/ (last updated Mar. 2013). Approximately 75% of patients receiving
a heart transplant survive at least five years post-transplant. Nat’l Heart,
Lung, & Blood Inst., What Is a Heart Transplant?, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/ht/.
185. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
186. These justifications could also extend to contexts outside of public
health. Justifying infringements on the individual rights of a vast majority of
the population (i.e., all newborn infants and their parents) to benefit very few
individuals could permit the state to justify almost any action, as long as it
protects/benefits even just one individual. For example, would we want the
state to justify mass unwarranted searches and seizures of homes based on the
premise that 1 in 500 will turn up an illegal activity (if we assume catching
criminals is in the public’s interest)? Although this analogy is not exact, it accurately exposes the risks and benefits behind the “common good” argument.
187. “Tangible harms” refer to risks of privacy/confidentiality breaches and
the harms that could result if a biobank security system were breached and
resulted in dissemination of a person’s genetic information.
188. “Intangible harms” is used to refer to the inherent disrespect felt by
individuals who were not given the opportunity to consent to the state’s use of
their child’s genetic information.
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III. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ADEQUATE INFORMED CONSENT POLICIES FOR THE
RETENTION AND USE OF RESIDUAL NBS
Good intentions and speculative benefits do not give a state
an absolute and un-tempered power to intrude on individual
189
rights. When restricting individual liberties, a state should
190
have “clear and convincing evidence” that the infringements
will achieve its goal(s) and should use the “least restrictive
191
means” possible to achieve these goals. In the context of residual NBS storage and use, states have failed on both accounts, most importantly the least restrictive means requirement. Research to advance medical knowledge and develop new
treatments is important, but it need not be achieved through
the surreptitious attainment of genetic material.
New parents are, in many ways, a captive audience. New
192
parents may feel overwhelmed after their child’s birth, but
there are still many opportunities to discuss what they want to
193
do with their child’s residual NBS. Part A proposes a model
189. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (recognizing “a sphere within which the individual may . . . dispute the authority of any
human government . . . to interfere with the exercise of that will”).
190. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 325–8(g) (West 2008); IND. CODE § 16-41-9-1.5 (LexisNexis 2011).
191. Many states have “least restrictive means necessary” requirements in
their quarantine statutes. See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 36-788 (2009); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3136; HAW. REV. STAT. § 325–8(b); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.419 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:13-15 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 433.128 (West 2011). For further commentary on the importance of a due
process procedure to govern quarantine decisions, see Gregory P. Campbell,
The Global H1N1 Pandemic, Quarantine Law, and the Due Process Conflict,
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 497 (2011).
192. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 13 (acknowledging the sometimeschaotic atmosphere after childbirth).
193. These opportunities are present during pre-natal visits and postpartum care/hospitalization. The majority of pregnant women in the United
States receive “adequate” prenatal care, as defined by the Adequacy of Prenatal Care Utilization (APNCU) Index, which involves more than eleven prenatal care visits. See Geraldine Oliva et al., Birth Data Analysis & Presentation
System Manual, EPIBC 2005 i-28 (2005), available at http://fhop.ucsf.edu/fhop/
docs/pdf/manuals/epibc05/EpiBC05man_all.pdf; America’s Health Rankings,
USA Prenatal Care (1990–2011), UNITED HEALTH FOUND. (2013), http://www
.americashealthrankings.org/All/PrenatalCare/2012 (indicating that roughly
70% of women throughout the U.S. receive adequate prenatal care as defined
by the APCNU Index). After giving vaginal birth, most women remain in the
hospital for two days, and Congress has enacted legislation requiring group
health plans to cover a minimum 48-hour post-partum hospital stay. See 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-25 (2006); Committee on Fetus and Newborn, Policy Statement—Hospital Stay for Healthy Term Newborns, 125 PEDIATRICS 405, 405
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that states should consider when developing and implementing
policies governing informed consent for residual NBS use. Parts
B and C discuss different times when informed consent may be
sought. States and public health researchers may resist such
policy changes, claiming they are too burdensome to implement. States can certainly choose to maintain their current policies (or lack thereof), but given the recent litigation in Texas
and Minnesota and the increasing publicity of state storage and
use of residual NBS and other genetic material, failing to make
changes increases the likelihood of future litigation.
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF AN OPT-OUT MODEL AND THE NEED
FOR AN OPT-IN PROFESSIONAL “REQUESTOR” POLICY
States should implement “opt-in” rather than “opt-out”
programs because opt-in policies promote information-sharing
and provide a better opportunity for parents to make informed
194
decisions. An opt-out system relies on presumed consent—
that parents agree to the storage and use of their child’s resid195
ual NBS unless they explicitly refuse. A potential problem
with opt-out systems is that they “require[] that health care
providers give parents more information than they currently
196
do” about the initial screening and the residual storage and
197
use of NBS. Therefore, an opt-out system “is not a true model
of consent because it does not require any form of consent; in198
stead . . . [it] functions as a substitute for consent.” Assuming
that silence is equivalent to consent is a problematic, and at
times mistaken, assumption to make, particularly given the ev-

(2010), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/125/2/405/full
.pdf; Employee Benefits Security Administration, Fact Sheet—Newborns’ and
Mothers’ Health Protection Act, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
newsroom/fsnmhafs.html#.UOiZQW9kw0U (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
194. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24–25.
195. Ross, supra note 5, at 313.
196. Id.
197. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that many jurisdictions
which allow parents to refuse the initial screenings do not require any patientprovider communication prior to the screening). Additionally, providers may
be unaware that refusal is an option, and thus do not inform parents of their
right to opt-out. See Real Life Stories: Taking Baby DNA, CITIZENS’ COUNCIL
ON
HEALTH CARE (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.cchfreedom.org/pdf/
RealLifeStories%20BabyDNA-1FINAL.pdf (“Our nurses didn’t even know we
could opt out, or that any collection was going to the government.”).
198. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24 (emphasis added).
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idence that many parents are ill-informed about residual stor199
age and use policies.
An “opt-in” consent procedure is preferable because it requires parents to provide “affirmative consent” to allow residu200
al NBS storage and use. An opt-in policy requires knowledge
and information on both sides: the “requestor” of consent must
know the procedures for obtaining consent and what storage
and use of residual NBS entails, and this information must be
provided to parents before they can consent and “opt-in” to residual storage and use. This model increases the exchange of
important information and requires improved training of the
201
medical professionals obtaining consent. An opt-in program
further ensures that parents have the opportunity to ask questions and address their concerns before deciding whether to
consent to research using their newborn’s residual NBS. Indeed, “the only way to be sure that someone is truly consent202
ing . . . is to obtain his or her affirmative consent.”
An opt-in model is particularly preferable in light of the
203
unclear risk-benefit ratio of residual NBS research. In her
discussion of opt-in versus opt-out consent procedures for the
initial NBS screenings, Doctor Lainie Friedman Ross posits
that while opt-out procedures for high benefit-risk ratio programs may be justifiable, when the benefit-risk ratio is unclear,
an opt-in procedure is preferable because it “may provide the
best way to balance respect for parental autonomy and the
204
promotion of children’s health.” Because residual NBS research has an unclear risk-benefit ratio, it is better suited for
an opt-in policy, which will promote a balance between respect
205
for parental autonomy and public health promotion.
To facilitate the development of improved informed consent
policies, a useful model for states to follow is a “requestor”
model, which has been successfully used as part of the organ

199. Id.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Currently, many medical professionals, such as obstetrical physicians
and nurses, as well as pediatricians, lack adequate information and training
about residual NBS storage and use. See id. at 24; Ross, supra note 5, at 319.
202. KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24 (emphasis added).
203. See supra Part II for a discussion of the lack of significant benefits
from residual NBS research and the concomitant privacy risks and liberty infringements of residual NBS use without parental consent.
204. Ross, supra note 5, at 320.
205. Id.
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206

procurement process.
Organ procurement organizations
(OPOs) have implemented requestor programs in order to in207
crease the number of available organs. The United States organ donation system operates under an “opt-in” model: the do208
nor himself can opt to be a donor prior to death or, if the
deceased did not indicate his preference, the potential donor’s
209
family is given the option of donation. The requestor model is
a multi-disciplinary team approach to discussing and requesting organ donation from deceased individual’s family mem210
bers. Although an organ procurement requestor’s role begins
at the end of life, an analogous requestor model can be used at
the beginning of life to facilitate informed parental consent in
procuring residual NBS for research. The circumstances in
which they are asked may be different, but what is being asked
of family members of the deceased or parents of a newborn is
quite similar—whether they wish to donate their relative’s personal biological material for the purpose of promoting the
211
health and well-being of others.

206. See, e.g., CAITLIN CARROLL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ROLES AND TRAINING IN THE DONATION PROCESS: A RESOURCE GUIDE,
at
Preface
(2000),
available
at
http://www.wsha.org/files/62/
RolesAndTrainingGuide.pdf (discussing 42 C.F.R. Part 482, which “requires
that those who [a] hospital designates to initiate donation requests receive
training offered or approved by the [organ procurement organization]”).
207. Id.
208. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts of 1967 and 1987 established the
right to donate all or part of one’s body upon death. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT
ACT § 1–2 (1987). Each state has a donor registry where individuals can sign
up to be organ donors. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., State Organ
and Tissue Donor Registries, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/
becomingdonor/stateregistries.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (2006) (allowing hospitals to participate in organ
procurement if the “hospital establishes written protocols for the identification
of potential organ donors that assure that families of potential organ donors
are made aware of the option of organ or tissue donation and their option to
decline”); see also UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3 (1987) (“Any member of the
following classes . . . may make an anatomical gift of all or a part of the decedent’s body for an authorized purpose, unless the decedent, at the time of
death, has made an unrevoked refusal to make that anatomical gift . . . .”);
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 14–15 (providing an overview of legislation
relevant to the organ donation process).
210. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 17.
211. Organ donation has clear health benefits—in 2012, 22,187 transplants
were performed using deceased donor organs. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., Deceased Donor Transplants in the U.S. by State, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
latestData/step2.asp (select Choose Category “Transplant” and select Choose
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Several studies support the effective use of a multidisciplinary “team” approach in obtaining consent for organ do212
nation that could be applied NBS donation. The model involves three roles which, although distinct, must collaborate for
the requestor model to be successful. The three roles are (1) co213
ordinator; (2) requestor; and (3) supporter. The coordinator
facilitates the collaboration of everyone involved in the process,
ensuring that it is “carried out in accordance with relevant pol214
icies and protocols.” The requestor has the important job of
empowering the parents to make decisions—he or she “is the
individual who will offer the option of donation . . . or discuss
215
donation with” the newborn’s parents. The supporter’s job is
to assist everyone in the process—the coordinator, the reques216
tor, and the infant’s parents.
Adequate training is essential to ensure effective and successful use of the team approach. Training is particularly important for requestors, whose role brings them into intimate
contact with parents during a momentous—and often overwhelming—time in their lives and thus requires patience, understanding, and respect. A requestor could be an existing
health care professional, such as a doctor, nurse, or social
worker, or hospitals could hire and train a person whose sole
job is to be a requestor. The model used by each hospital may
differ, as larger hospitals with more births may benefit from
having employees whose sole job is to request NBS donations.
Some of the necessary components of a successful and respect217
ful donation request policy include : (1) understanding families in the post-childbirth stage; (2) maintaining respect for the
family; (3) developing communication skills; (4) getting to know
the parents; (5) assessing family dynamics and modifying approaches; (6) being sensitive to cultural, religious, and spiritual
218
influences;
and (7) providing ongoing support and inforOrgan “All,” follow “Deceased Donor Transplants by State”) (data last updated
Oct. 11, 2013).
212. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 17.
213. Id. at 17–18.
214. Id. at 18.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Adapted from id. at 27–29.
218. Successfully fulfilling numbers (5) and (6) may require matching a requestor with the parents, because “people tend to respond more positively to
individuals that they feel they can trust or with whom they can identify.” Id.
at 29. This can involve having a requestor that speaks the parents’ native language, understands or practices the parents’ religion, and is of the same eth-
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mation. Regardless of the method chosen—using an existing
employee to act as a requestor or hiring an employee whose sole
role is to be a requestor—all health care providers who interact
with parents—both pre-natal and post-natal—should receive
training and education on residual NBS policies, as there is
currently a general lack of knowledge about this topic among
219
the medical profession.
Storage and use of residual NBS can be a complicated topic
to understand and parents may have numerous questions.
Therefore, the requestor must be willing and able to spend considerable time with parents to ensure they have ample opportunity to ask questions and understand the storage process and
220
what their child’s NBS may be used for during research.
State policies should allow parents to change their minds
and later request that their child’s stored NBS be destroyed.
Requestors must have adequate training in and understanding
of the process of de-identification or anonymization of NBS, and
states should enact policies that require anonymization, a process that strips the blood sample of all identifiers so that the
sample is—as much as is scientifically possible—anonymous
221
and nearly impossible to trace back to the particular infant.
B. PRE-NATAL CARE DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENT
The ideal scenario is to begin discussions about residual
NBS storage and use during pre-natal care. The requestor,
along with pre-natal care providers—who should receive specific training and education on their state’s newborn screening
program and NBS retention policies—could introduce the idea
of residual NBS research to the parent(s) at prenatal care visits. Alternatively, separate appointments could be made for the
sole purpose of discussing residual NBS use to ensure the requestor has adequate time to explain the policies and procenic, racial, or cultural background as the parents. Id. at 29. Using “like” requestors is associated with improved donation rates among both African
American and Hispanic individuals. See, e.g., Susan L. Bratton et al., Pediatric
Organ Transplantation Needs: Organ Donation Best Practices, 160 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 468, 469 (2006); JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., HEALTH CARE AT THE CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR NARROWING THE ORGAN DONATION GAP AND PROTECTING PATIENTS
8, 13, 18 (2004), available at http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/
organ_donation_white_paper.pdf.
219. See KILAKKATHI, supra note 2, at 24; Ross, supra note 5, at 319.
220. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 206, at 27.
221. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 107, at 31–32.
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dures and to allow the parents to ask questions. It should be
clear to parents that they have the option to refuse residual
NBS retention and use. The pre-natal discussions would be ongoing and final decisions would not be made nor consent given
until after the child’s birth. Beginning the discussion as early
as possible allows parents to think through their decisions and
to ask questions. This method recognizes that informed consent
should be more than a signature on a page—it should be a process during which the consenter comes to know and truly understand what it is he or she is consenting to.
C. POST-NATAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONSENT
The unfortunate reality is that not all women receive pre222
natal care and thus pre-natal discussions will not always be
possible. In such situations, after the woman has given birth
and recuperated, but prior to discharge, a trained requestor
should engage the parent(s) in a discussion about storage and
residual use. The conversation should not occur immediately
prior to discharge, as the woman is likely receiving other information at this time and may be in a hurry to get out of the
hospital. In a rush to complete a mountain of discharge paperwork, the parent(s) may make hurried judgments that are not
truly informed and well thought-out. All parents should be given time to think about their decision if they are unsure—
residual NBS should not be disseminated for research purposes
for at least one month after the infant is born. Requestors could
follow-up with a phone call to discuss the parent’s decision, an
appointment could be made, or the issue could be re-visited at
the newborn’s one-month physical. Parents should not feel
rushed into the decision—if they are not ready to provide consent, they should have additional time.
Contrary to some arguments, parental consent is possible
for residual NBS research. The costs and burdens of an opt-in,
consensual procedure are inadequate justifications to completely forego parental consent. In an age of impressive advancements in genomic medicine, we must be aware of potential privacy issues and draw lines early and often between legitimate
and illegitimate use of our genetic information without consent.
222. In 2010, approximately 6.2% of mothers received late (defined as
third-trimester or later) or no prenatal care. CHILD TRENDS DATA BANK, LATE
OR NO PRENATAL CARE: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH app. 1, at 9
(2012), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
25_Prenatal_Care.pdf.
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As a society, we cannot allow administrative costs or burdens to
justify infringements on individual rights, parental rights, and
genetic privacy. Protections and safeguards are possible—we
simply must be willing to spend the time and resources to develop and implement them.
CONCLUSION
The government’s interest in and obligation to promote
public health is historically, legally, and socially acknowledged.
This interest cannot, however, justify non-consensual use of residual NBS. Although residual NBS research has the potential
to promote public health through discovery of new diseases and
treatment, such benefits have thus far been tenuous at best. A
state’s police power is not absolute and cannot be invoked to
justify a blanket waiver of parental consent for residual NBS
use. To avoid future litigation, states must address their inadequate or altogether non-existent policies governing residual
NBS retention and use. These policies should include a robust
informed consent procedure that will increase transparency
and seek a balance between individual rights and the importance of public health research that aims to detect new conditions, develop new therapies, and eradicate diseases.

